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Stacking the Commission:  
Has it occurred and does it matter in unfair dismissal arbitration? 
 
Kim Southey, University of Southern Queensland 
Dr Simon Fry, RMIT 
The Keating and Howard governments were accused of stacking the personnel of 
the Australian Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC) with appointees from 
respectively, union and employer associated backgrounds. By January 2010, the 
Labor Government will have its version of an industrial umpire, Fair Work 
Australia (FWA), fully operational. Labor‟s claim is that the FWA appointment 
process will prevent the making of biased selections of members by the party in 
power. The unresolved question is whether such stacking, if it has occurred, 
matters? By conducting an examination of 883 unfair dismissal claims subjected 
to arbitration by the AIRC from 2001 to 2005, we conclude that the representation 
of employer and union members hearing unfair dismissal claims during the data 
collection period, is reasonably balanced in spite of the various figures produced 
by different bodies. A mildly significant correlation exists between the work 
background of the members and their substantive arbitration decisions, that is, 
members may be more likely to make a decision that is congruent with them 
having worked in either employer or worker focused positions, prior to AIRC 
appointment. Although when non-substantive arbitration decisions were analysed, 
the correlation between the members‟ backgrounds and their decisions was 
insignificant. Here it appears that jurisdictional guidelines may logically limit the 
potential to exercise bias in arbitral decision making.  
Introduction 
The Australian Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC) will be fully subsumed by Labor‟s 
new industrial umpire, Fair Work Australia (FWA) by January 2010. The Government 
believes FWA will address the ongoing controversy over appointments to the AIRC. During 
their leadership, both the Keating and Howard governments were accused of compromising 
the impartiality and neutrality of the AIRC by appointing personnel to the Commission from 
respectively union and employer association backgrounds.  
In the lead to the 2007 election, the opposition described the Liberal Government of 
possessing „a tawdry system of appointing political mates‟ to the AIRC (Norington & Hannan 
2007). While in Opposition, Labor claimed that of the appointments made to the Commission 
by the Howard Government, only two had union backgrounds whilst 14 had backgrounds 
with employer associations (Gillard 2007). In a media release announcing its final two 
appointments, the Workplace Relations Minister, Kevin Andrews (2004) had put the Liberal 
Government‟s view differently:  
These two appointments bring to 40 the number of Commission members, of whom 17 are 
former union officials, 16 are from employer backgrounds, two have worked for both 
unions and employers, seven were barristers or solicitors, six were public servants and 
one was an academic. 
At the time, Craig Emerson, ALP workplace spokesman was reported in The Age as 
describing these appointments as „one of the last desperate acts of a desperate government 
Southey and Fry 
 2 
trying to give its mates a job for life‟ (Robinson 2004). The ongoing debate about biased 
appointments to the AIRC led, in 2007, to the Labor Opposition (now Government) to 
commit to a new process of appointments to the Commission to ensure „appointments will not 
favour one side over the other but will be made through a transparent selection process‟ 
(Gillard 2008). The reality is that the composition of the members of the FWA will remain 
unchanged from the AIRC based on the current government reminding us that „as announced 
previously, the existing full time members of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission 
will be offered roles in Fair Work Australia‟ (Gillard 2009).   
In view of the interest the employment background of AIRC appointments has generated for a 
number of decades in Australia, this paper looks at whether work experience bears a 
relationship to the members‟ judgements. To do this we examined 883 unfair dismissal 
arbitration decisions made by the AIRC between 2001 and 2005 in relation to the employment 
backgrounds of the 56 commission members who made those decisions.  
Previous literature 
Appointments to the federal tribunal have attracted some academic interest, although there is 
no definitive or detailed account of this matter available over recent decades when academic 
interest has waned. Dabscheck and Niland (1981) provided a detailed account of the matter up 
to 1980 and Macintyre (2004) provides a broad overview of these issues over the first century 
of the federal tribunal‟s life. Others have provided more detailed expositions of the 
backgrounds of commissioners at various times (Foenander 1952; Sheridan 1989). They have 
tended to advance both ad hoc observations about the tendencies of particular tribunal 
members and generalisations about the influence of particular sorts of backgrounds on 
decisions. But few systematic examinations of bias in decisions of commissioners have 
occurred in Australia, if not worldwide. Mills (1980) study into tribunal decisions did not seek 
to relate its findings of bias between tribunal members to the issue of member background. A 
2006 study by Chelliah and D‟Netto examined the relationship between the reason the 
employee was dismissed and the arbitration decision and remedies of the AIRC. A more 
recent study by Southey (2008) identified gender bias in unfair dismissal decisions of the 
AIRC. The uniqueness of this paper is that it contains an empirical examination of four years 
of arbitration decisions pertaining to unfair dismissal with the intention of determining 
whether members‟ working backgrounds are correlated to decisions favouring either the 
worker or the employer. 
The ‘stacking’ debate 
Australians have criticised appointments to the AIRC and suggested biased sympathies since 
the appointment of Justice Higgins in 1907. To keep within the word limitation, we will 
reflect briefly on the more recent governments, Howard and Keating. 
As a starting point, Dabscheck and Niland (1981) tabulated the appointments made between 
1956 and 1980. Between 1956 and 1972 there were 15 presidential appointments of members 
with a background as a „barrister/solicitor‟. After the change to the mandatory legal 
qualification rule in 1972, there were a further 15 appointments up to 1980, of nine were 
barristers/solicitors, one unionist, one academic and three with a government background. In 
the same period (1956 to 1980) including the leftovers from the Chifley years, there were 49 
commissioners, of whom 21 had a union background, 17 had an employer background, 9 had 
a government background, and 2 were in the legal profession.  
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The 1980s saw an emergence of vocal criticisms of the Commission. Some indication of the 
reasons for this can be found in Macintyre (2004: 95) where Bill Kelty, the ACTU president 
claims the Commission was biased in favour of employers. 
Kelty claimed that the National Wage cases were „rigged‟ to favour employers. Kelty 
referred here to the role of the President in composing the bench for such cases. By his 
reckoning, there were fifteen members with employer backgrounds, seventeen with union 
backgrounds and thirteen „independents‟, yet he found that those with employer 
backgrounds made up a majority of the bench in nearly half of the National Wage Cases. 
By another account, Kelty‟s analysis was flawed, because of his mis-classification of 
barristers who had worked with employer groups as „employer‟; moreover it is alleged that 
this sort of thinking inspired the Keating government to begin appointing more union-based 
members. Many years later, in announcing Labor‟s new unbiased appointment process for 
FWA, Deputy Prime Minister Gillard freely acknowledged Labor wasn‟t immune from 
temptation (in Steketee 2007). The Keating government attracted its share of criticism at its 
appointments to the AIRC. In 1994 the ACTU was reported to be promoting a particular 
candidate (Ian MacPhee) to be president of the AIRC. A feature article in the Sydney 
Morning Herald (1994a: 12) stated: 
The realities of the Industrial Relations Club dictate that the Government would be 
foolish not to consult the ACTU in making its decision. It would be equally foolish not to 
consult employers‟ representatives. But neither party should be acting as the 
Government‟s head-hunter for the position. 
In the end, Labor appointed Justice O‟Connor as president. Justice O‟Conner was viewed to 
be „without links to the established IR networks‟ (Green 1994: 26). The appointment was met 
with Howard‟s response, as Opposition spokesman that, „she is anything but distant from the 
NSW Right. She many not pay her dues but she is certainly not distant from them. It is all very 
cosy, isn‟t it?‟ (Johnston 1994:2)  It was reported that employer groups criticised the 
appointment of Justice O‟Connor on the basis that she did not have an industrial relations 
background (Green and Johnston 1994). Around the same time the Opposition and several 
industry groups also spoke against the Keating appointment of Iain Ross, touted as the likely 
successor to the ACTU secretary Bill Kelty, with sentiments they would „rather have 
someone who is perceived to have an independent background‟ (Handberg in Johnston 
1994:2). By the end of 1994 the press was critical of the Labor Government appointments. 
The following quote appearing in the Sydney Morning Herald (1994b: 6) 
The federal government must take much of the blame for the commission‟s current 
problems. For some years now its appointments to the commission have been biased in 
favour of the trade union movement, thus destroying the balance which had previously 
been so important in maintaining the commission‟s credibility. 
Initial criticisms of the Howard Government‟s approach to Commission personnel were 
concerned with a lack of appointments rather than biased ones. In the late 1990s, the 
government offered existing personnel voluntary redundancy packages, prompting ten or so to 
take early retirement. With only one new appointment, this led to a reduction in personnel 
from 55 in 1996 to 40 by 2000 (Illawara Mercury, 27 June 2000). The one appointment made 
between 1996 and 2001 was triggered by the resignation of Labor‟s President, Justice 
O‟Connor. Justice Giudice was appointed President in 1997 without generating much 
controversy, although the ACTU was reported as being critical of the decision, suggesting 
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„Mr Giudice had shown a consistent propensity to accept briefs from extreme employers 
which was not offset by a willingness to represent workers‟ (in Gordon & Way 1997: 1). 
Justice Giudice had been a barrister specialising in labour law and industrial relations since 
1980. In announcing the appointment, Minister Peter Reith made mention that Giudice‟s first 
job after leaving university was as a research officer with the Health and Community Services 
Union (Reith 1997). A point also noted by ACTU president Jennie George in her welcoming 
speech at Giudice‟s appointment which Way (1998: 38) suggested was used to illustrate that 
„he wasn‟t always a hired gun for employers‟.  
Criticism of the Commission seemed to intensify by 2000, with the CFMEU media release 
labelling the AIRC as „the puppet of the Federal Government and big business‟ (CFMEU 
2000). This was partly a result of the Commission‟s handling of a number of major disputes, 
which included unfair dismissal hearings for mineworkers at the Blair Athol mine in 
Queensland. The union‟s president, Tony Maher, „called for the overhaul of the Commission, 
saying that its incompetence was partly due to the practice of favoured political appointments 
over the years of people who were not capable of doing the job‟ (CFMEU 2000). Up until that 
point, Giudice was the only appointment made by the Coalition, so the union‟s criticism 
seems to have been directed almost exclusively towards earlier Labor appointees.  
The first tranche of the Liberal Government‟s new appointees was announced in December 
2000 with four new senior deputy presidents. According to a report in the Australian 
Financial Review, „Senior union officials‟ were said to have „accused the Government of 
“stacking” the commission with ex-employer representatives and trenchant critics of the 
AIRC who are philosophically opposed to such “third party” tribunals‟ (Long 2000). Shortly 
after this, a feature article by Shaw (2001) in The Age reported: 
The unions claimed Mr Reith had breached a long-standing political tradition of making 
balanced appointments to the commission. They also claim he broke convention by failing 
to discuss the appointments with the trade union movement. 
Sheldon and Thornthwaite (2001: 220) interpreted the appointment of this set of senior deputy 
presidents as a sign that: 
... the networks of federal government patronage in industrial relations have become ever 
narrower in ideological terms; that there is no longer even a pretence of bipartisanship 
in appointments to crucial “umpire” positions.  
There were two relatively uncontroversial appointments during 2001 but perhaps the greatest 
controversy arose in September 2001, following Minister Abbott‟s appointment of four new 
deputy presidents and two commissioners just prior to the 2001 election. Of the six, five were 
described as „conservative‟ and only one unionist (Abbott 2001a). ACTU president Sharan 
Burrow responded to the appointments as breaking the tradition of balancing appointments 
„on the eve of an election campaign‟ (Robinson 2001: 3). She was reported to have said: 
The government had stacked the AIRC to shore up its conservative workplace agendas 
and to suit its political purposes. They are trying to destroy the independent umpire and 
undermine bipartisanship and political neutrality in industrial relations (Robinson 2001: 
3).  
The Government‟s response to these criticisms was that it was addressing resource issues in 
the Commission as requested by the ACTU (Norington 2001). Norington (2001) also reports 
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that a Liberal Government spokesperson stated, 79 per cent of the Commission consisted of 
appointments made by the previous Labor Government and pointed out that Labor had also 
made appointments in large batches, such as six in March 1994 and two just prior to the 1996 
election.  
In 2002, three appointments were made, of which one, at commission level, was union-based. 
In March 2002, the CFMEU‟s Tony Maher continued his attack, saying the government had 
„nobbled the commission as an independent industrial arbitrator and conciliator‟ (Kirkwood 
2002).  Maher assessed that 11 of the last 12 appointments and 30 of the 49 current members 
were from the employer side (Kirkwood 2002). Labor MP Kelly Hoare backed this, stating: 
„[The Howard Government] can‟t say they were just balancing up the numbers, because in 13 
years of the Hawke-Keating governments just 27 of 61 appointments came from unions‟ 
(Kirkwood 2002) 
In 2003, one „conservative‟ appointment was made. According to ACTU president Sharan 
Burrow, the appointment „contravened the practice of replacing union-oriented 
commissioners with like-minded nominees‟ (in Robinson 2003: 3). The ABC reported at the 
time that this was the 16
th
 appointment to the commission by the Howard Government and 
only two of those have a union background (ABC Newsonline 2003). Two further Howard 
appointments, sourced from the public sector, were made in 2004 with an announcement by 
the Minister that the Government had maintained balanced numbers in the Commission 
(Andrews 2004).  
Research Method 
The data for this analysis were collected from the unfair dismissal decisions made by 
members of the Commission between the 1
st
 January 2002 and 31
st
 December 2005. These 
decisions are publicly available on the AIRC website (now transferred to the FWA website). 
We isolated, for analysis, unfair dismissal arbitration decisions made by a single member of 
the Commission (not bench decisions). This included substantive and non-substantive 
arbitration decisions. Substantive arbitration decisions occur when the parameters of a claim 
fall within the jurisdiction of the Commission thereby allowing it to make a determination as 
to whether or not the termination was harsh, unjust or unreasonable. Non-substantive 
decisions are those where the Commission ruled the application was out of its jurisdiction for 
reasons such as the dismissed employee was a trainee, apprentice, short term casual or on 
probation. Non substantive cases were collected for analysis on the basis that they too require 
an assessment by the Commission as to the jurisdictional suitability of the claim. Decisions 
excluded from the analysis were full bench hearings of appeals made against arbitration 
decisions, „out of time‟ cases, and claims by non-award employees or salary earners above the 
remuneration limit.  
Information pertaining to the work history of the various members of the Commission 
presiding decisions from 2002 to 2005 was collected via reference to the Australian Who‟s 
Who, parliamentary records, literature and media searches. The categorisation of Commission 
members according to their work history involved identifying the member as „union‟ if the 
member had worked for a union and „employer‟ if they had worked for an employer 
association or management of an organisation. Members were classified as „neither‟ where 
they had worked for both a union and employer association, or had careers in the legal, 
academic or public service. An appendix contains the listing of Commission members and the 
work history classification as used in the statistical analysis. The appointing party was 
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allocated according the party in Government at the time of the member‟s selection to the 
AIRC.  
Descriptive analyses were performed to calculate frequencies and decision rates for each 
value within the independent variables to provide a profile of the unfair dismissal arbitration 
decisions returned for the four year sampling period. Chi-square tests, with significance 
recognised if p <.05, were performed to determine whether the variations in the decisions 
were associated with either the appointing political party or the work history of the 
Commission member. 
Results and discussion 
The analysis of the 883 cases revealed 352 cases (39.8%) were arbitrated in the workers‟ 
favour, 292 (33.1%) in the employers‟ favour and 239 (27.1%) were found to be out of 
jurisdiction (non-substantive claims). Labor appointed members of the Commission 
determined 585 of the cases (66.3%) and Liberal appointees determined 298 of the cases 
(33.7%). Commission members with a previous union based career presided 375 cases (42%) 
while members with a previous career in management or employer associations determined 
266 cases (30%). Finally, 242 cases (27.4%) were settled by members affiliated with both 
union and employer focused positions, or alternatively, non specific employer/union 
backgrounds.  
Decision rates were calculated for each of the variables because of the diversity in the 
proportions of cases heard by members when classified according to their appointing party 
and employment background. The decision rate identifies the percentage of decisions that are 
made in favour of the worker, in favour of the employer or ruled out of jurisdiction in relation 
to the various classifications of the Commission members. These rates are presented in Table 
1 and allow for a fair comparison of decisions.  
Table 1.  Decision Rates by Independent Variable 
 
 
Decision 
(n = 883) 
Variable: Appointing Party Variable: Work History 
Labor Liberal Union Employer Both/Neither 
Worker‟s Favour   41% (n=240)   38% (n=112)  44% (n=165)  35% (n=  93)  39% (n=  94) 
Employer‟s Favour   32% (n=185)   36% (n=107)  30% (n=112)  38% (n=102)  32% (n=  78) 
Outside 
Jurisdiction 
  27% (n=160)   26% (n=  79)  26% (n=  98)  27% (n=  71)  29% (n=  70) 
Totals 100%(n=585) 100%(n=298) 100%(n=375) 100%(n=266) 100%(n=242) 
Table 1 illustrates Labor and Liberal party appointees have only a three to four per cent 
variance in their decisions rates. Labor appointees made decisions favouring workers 41% of 
the time and 38% of the time by Liberal appointees. Decisions favouring the employer were 
32% and 36% by Labor and Liberal appointed members respectively. Out of jurisdiction 
decisions were similarly determined with both parties showing a close 26% and 27% of their 
cases ruled out on jurisdictional grounds. 
The work history values suggest a trend matching the proposition that union background 
members will tend to favour workers and employer background members will tend to favour 
employers. The decisions rates show members with a union background decided in favour of 
the worker 44% of the time whereas members with an employer background decided in 
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favour of the worker only 35% of the time. In between the two extremes are those members 
who are not clearly either union or employer affiliated, deciding in favour of the worker 39% 
of the time. An opposing trend presents when cases decided in favour of the employer are 
reviewed. These decision rates show that employer related members most frequently decided 
in favour of the employer with a 38% decision rate. At the other extreme, the union associated 
members decided in favour of the employer only 30% of the time, with the „neutrals‟ again 
showing a mid-range rate of 32%.   
Table 2.  Unfair Dismissal Decisions χ2 Results: Substantive Claims 
 
Variable 
Worker’s 
Favour 
Employer’s  
Favour 
χ2, df, p value 
Appointing Party  (n=644) 
   
 
Labor 240  (37.3%) 185  (28.7%) χ
2 
= 1.6561 , df 1, p = .1981 
Liberal 112  (17.4%) 107  (16.6%) Not significant  p >.05 
    
Work History (a)  (n=472)    
Union 165  (35.0%) 112  (23.7%) χ
2 
= 6.5111 , df 1, p = .0107 
Employer    93  (19.7%) 102  (21.6%) Significant p <.05 
    
Work History (b)  (n=644)    
Union 165  (25.6%) 112  (17.4%) χ
2 
= 6.5110 , df 2, p = .0386 
Employer    93  (14.5%) 102  (15.8%) Significant p <.05 
Both/Other   94  (14.6%)   78  (12.1%)  
The chi-square analysis, presented in Table 2, reveals first that no statistically significant 
difference occurs between decisions by Commission members based on whether they were 
appointed by a Labor or Liberal government. However, statistically significant differences 
occur within the variable, work history, in terms of the 644 within jurisdiction decisions. This 
finding provides statistical support for the trends observed in Table 1 with the chi-squares 
indicating the decision rates occurred beyond simple random variation. In Table 2, the chi-
square test labelled „work history (a)‟ analyses the dichotomised positions of union versus 
employer background. The „work history (b)‟ test introduced the third category „both/other‟ in 
order to detect whether the potentially neutral background diluted the dichotomised results. 
Both tests showed that the arbitration decisions are associated with the work background of 
the Commission member. The tests both suggest significant differences between the decisions 
favouring workers and employers in relation to the work history of the presiding Commission 
member. We do note that the level of significant is at 95% confidence, the traditional and 
acceptable probability level used in statistics (Collis and Hussey 2003). Ideally, a 99% 
confidence would have provided us with more certainty of the result.   
Table 3.  Unfair Dismissal Decisions χ2 Results: All Claims 
 
 Substantive Claims Non-
Substantive 
Claims 
 
Variable 
Worker’s 
Favour 
Employer’s 
Favour 
χ2, df, p value 
Appointing Party  (n=883)    χ
2 
= 1.7329, df 2, 
p = .4204 
Not significant  p >.05 
Labor 240 (27.2%) 185 (21.0%) 160 (18.1%) 
Liberal 112 (12.7%) 107 (12.1%) 79 (8.9%) 
 
Work History (n = 883) 
     
 
χ
2 
= 7.1732, df 2, 
p = .1270 
Not significant  p >.05 
Union 165 (18.7%) 112 (12.7%)   98 (11.1%) 
Employer   93 (10.5%) 102 (11.6%)  71 (8.1%) 
Both/Other  94 (10.6%) 78 (8.8%)  70 (7.9%) 
Southey and Fry 
 8 
Table 3 analysed the data for all 883 cases by incorporating a third value in the dependent 
variable: non-substantive claims. No statistically significant differences in decisions were 
found for variables assessing both the appointing party and the work history of the 
commission member. The introduction of the „outside jurisdiction‟ cases diluted the existing 
significant differences in decisions made by commissioners. 
Discussion 
Our analysis initially suggests that it is inconsequential which governing party made the 
appointments. We found that the appointing party – Labor or Liberal - is not directly 
associated with members conferring unfair dismissal decisions that are more likely to favour 
the employer or worker. We found that of the members overseeing unfair dismissal decisions, 
the balance of appointments appeared to be on an reasonably even keel, with 21 members 
assigned a „union‟ background, 19 members assigned an „employer‟ background, and 16 
„neutrals‟, two of which held both union and employer related positions and the remaining 14 
from largely the public service or legal professions. We acknowledge the challenge of clearly 
defining a member‟s background. To limit misrepresenting the data by incorrectly classifying 
the members, we took a conservative approach before assigning a clear union or employer 
label to the various members. That is, if their work history did not enable us to determine a 
clear employer/union alliance we assigned the „neutral‟ category. We accept that there may be 
debate about our final classification of members as shown in the appendix. 
Of most interest is the finding that the direction of the decision in substantive arbitration cases 
correlates with the work history of the commission member. This association remained 
consistent when we tested decisions determined only by members classified with a clear 
union or employer background, and when testing decisions that also incorporated decisions 
made by members with a mixed work history. Bearing in mind this is a correlational analysis, 
the results serve as a preliminary indicator that members with an employer background are 
more likely to favour the employer, members with a union background tend to favour the 
worker and members with either a mixed background and/or from other areas such a legal, 
public service or academia may also favour the worker. Another pattern was also identified 
amongst the members that were not clearly distinguished from an employer or union 
background. These „neutral‟ members demonstrated decision rates that sat between the 
union/employer extremes. These findings suggest appointments to the Commission made by a 
political party when in power may bear some influence on the arbitration outcomes and 
subsequent industrial environment.  
When non-substantive arbitrations are incorporated into the analysis we found a different 
phenomenon occurred. The association between background and the arbitration decision 
weakens to a point of statistical insignificance. People making an unfair dismissal claim first 
have to fit within the jurisdictional boundaries of the AIRC and our analysis indicates that the 
interpretation and application of those boundaries are not being applied more or less 
favourably by any of its members and regardless of their previous work history and alliances. 
This suggests that arbitrators operating within guidelines to determine what may be within 
jurisdiction and what is not, such as deciding whether the employee was a short term casual, 
on probation or a trainee, are showing less differentiation amongst their decisions. This is 
logical, as the jurisdictional guidelines provide less scope to flex a bias. 
The issue of whether decisions were made by senior or junior members of the Commission 
was not addressed within the scope of this study. This factor presents a potential area of future 
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investigation which may generate interesting results as a higher number of cases would be 
heard by „commissioner‟ level members compared to the senior or presidential members. 
Conclusion 
We note that arbitration decisions are influenced by many factors specific to each case. The 
attention channelled over the years to whether a Labor appointed commissioner or one that 
has a union background, is more likely to favour the interests of workers and vice versa for a 
Liberal appointed commissioner provided the inspiration for the narrow focus of this study. 
We suggest the union/employer member balance is not disproportionate despite the many 
accusations of the Keating and Howard governments „stacking‟ the commission with 
members aligned to their interests. Moreover, the members least represented are „the 
neutrals‟: those people exposed to the challenges faced by both parties in the employment 
relationship. That said, our research suggests future appointments to FWA should continue to 
accommodate the balance between union/employer members on the basis that there is 
preliminary evidence to support the proposition that the decisions made by the tribunal 
members, in substantive unfair dismissal arbitration, corresponded with the previous work 
and professional associations they held. 
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Appendix. Employment background classification of Members of the AIRC arbitrating 
unfair dismissal claims from January 2002 to December 2005 
 
Commission 
Member 
Sample Work History 
Appointing 
Party 
Union/Employer 
Background 
Com Bacon Qld Mining Council; Qld Coal Association Labor Employer 
Com Bartell Liquor Hospitality and Miscellaneous Workers Union Liberal Union 
Com Blair Vehicle Builders Employees Federation Labor Union 
Com Cargill Industrial Registry (Brereton 1994) Labor Neither 
Com Cribb Consultant in HR Labor Neither 
Com Deegan Industrial Registrar; DIR Labor Neither 
Com Eames NUW Labor Union 
Com Foggo Australian Teachers Union Labor Union 
Com Gay Ansett Airlines Labor Employer 
Com Grainger Solicitor; Dep Chair A Broadcast Auth; SBS; NSW rail Liberal Neither 
Com Harrison GJ AMWU Labor Union 
Com Hingley Finance Sector Union Labor Union 
Com Hodder Australian Workers' Union (dual appointment QIRC) Labor Union 
Com Hoffman Qld Confederation of Industry Labor Employer 
Com Holmes Victorian public service Labor Neither 
Com Jones AMOCO and ESSO Labor Employer 
Com Larkin Hawker de Havilland, Cathay Pacific etc Lea  Labor Employer 
Com Lawson Dir, Chamber Manufactures NSW, GM Broken Hill mine Labor Employer 
Com Lesses Trades and Labour Council Liberal Union 
Com Lewin AWU   Labor Union 
Com Mansfield ACTU Liberal Union 
Southey and Fry 
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Commission 
Member 
Sample Work History 
Appointing 
Party 
Union/Employer 
Background 
Com O'Connor Transport Workers' Union Labor Union 
Com Raffaeli Fed Misc Workers Union Labor Union 
Com Redmond AWU - FIME Labor Union 
Com Richards COS Min WPR PK  Reith; BCA Liberal Employer 
Com Roberts CPSU Liberal Union 
Com Simmonds Hospital Employees Federation, ACTU Labor Union 
Com Smith Con. Australian Industry Labor Employer 
Com Spencer Aust Retailers Assn; Sugar Milling Cl Liberal Employer 
Com Thatcher 
Royal Com Bldg & Construction, Qld Depart Training & 
Industrial Relations, BCA 
Liberal Employer 
Com Tolley PKIU, NSWLC; Linfox, Aust Road Trans Industry Org  Labor Both 
Com Whelan ACTU Labor Union 
DP Blain Pres Ac Staff Asn UWA; Academic; Govt; Business Liberal Both 
DP Hamilton Australian Chamber Commerce and Industry Liberal Employer 
DP Hampton SA Employers Chamber  Liberal Employer 
DP Ives Gen Manager HR WMC and others Liberal Employer 
DP Leary Brambles Industries Limited Labor Employer 
DP McCarthy Chamber of Commerce & Industry WA Liberal Employer 
SDP Acton ACTU Labor Union 
SDP Boulton  ACTU Labor Union 
SDP Cartwright Managing Director ER Telstra; Comalco Liberal Employer 
SDP Drake Lawyer Labor Neither 
SDP Duncan Solicitor; Coal Industry Tribunal Labor Neither 
SDP Hamberger Employment Advocate; Advisor to Min IR Liberal Neither 
SDP Harrison AM Partner Baker O'Loughlin Solicitors Labor Neither 
SDP Kaufman Barrister 1974-2001 Liberal Neither 
SDP Lacy 
Barrister; Asst Dir, IR Bureau; District Registrar Federal 
Court Australia 
Liberal Neither 
SDP Lloyd A Bldg & Constn Commission; Fed Dept E&WPR Liberal Neither 
SDP Marsh ACTU Labor Union 
SDP O'Callaghan Exec Dir SA Employers Federation; Govt departments Liberal Employer 
SDP Polites  Labor Employer 
SDP Williams Barrister Labor Neither 
VP Lawler Barrister; NSW Atty-Gen Dept  Liberal Neither 
VP Ross ACTU Labor Union 
VP Watson Partner Freehills; Mines & Minerals Assn; Comalco Liberal Employer 
J Munro Sec ACOA  Labor Union 
 
 
Adapted from: (AIRC Annual Reports from 1985 to 1996 inclusive; Abbott 2001a, 2001b, 2002, 2003; Andrews 
2004; Brereton 1994; Dabscheck & Niland 1981; Long 2000; Reith 1997, 2000; Who‟s Who in Australia 2007) 
 
 
                                                 
i
 This paper has been peer reviewed by two anonymous referees. 
 
